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Abstract
Well-established methods exist for measuring party positions, but reliable means for es-
timating intra-party preferences remain underdeveloped. While most efforts focus on es-
timating the ideal points of individual legislators based on inductive scaling of roll call
votes, this data suffers from two problems: selection bias due to unrecorded votes, and
strong party discipline which tends to make voting a strategic rather than a sincere indi-
cation of preferences. By contrast, legislative speeches are relatively unconstrained, since
party leaders are less likely to punish MPs for speaking freely as long as they vote with the
party line. Yet the differences between roll call estimations and text scalings remain es-
sentially unexplored, despite the growing application of statistical analysis of textual data
to measure policy preferences. Our paper addresses this lacuna by exploiting a rich fea-
ture of the Swiss legislature: On most bills, legislators both vote and speak many times.
Using this data, we compare text-based scaling of ideal points to vote-based scaling from
a crucial piece of energy legislation. Our findings confirm that text scalings reveal larger
intra-party differences than roll calls. Using regression models we further explain the dif-
ferences between roll call and text scalings by attributing differences to constituency-level
preferences for energy policy.
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1 Legislative Speeches and Legislative Votes
Accurately estimating the policy preferences of individual legislators has long formed a key
part of efforts to model intra-party politics. To date, the vast majority of work in this area has
relied on inductive scaling of roll call votes, using either discriminant (Poole and Rosenthal,
1997) or Bayesian statistical methods (Clinton, Jackman and Rivers, 2004). Yet roll call votes
in parliamentary systems suffer from a number of problems that prevent them from forming a
reliable basis for estimating legislators’ ideal points. In most settings a significant proportion of
legislative votes are not recorded, often for strategic reasons, while the votes that are singled out
for roll calls may also be politically motivated, both resulting in selection bias (VanDoren, 1990;
Carrubba et al., 2006; Carrubba, Gabel and Hug, 2008; Hug, 2010). Perhaps more significantly,
voting in most parliamentary systems is tightly controlled through party discipline, meaning
that legislators vote with their party possibly not because of their policy preferences, but rather
in spite of them (Laver, Benoit and Garry, 2003; Proksch and Slapin, 2010).
What legislators say, however, is relatively unconstrained by comparison, and a growing
subfield devoted to estimating legislator preferences using text as data has made good use of
this information (e.g. Slapin and Proksch, 2010; Monroe and Maeda, 2004; Laver and Benoit,
2002). Party leaders, it is believed, are less likely to punish legislators based on what they may
say in a debate on a controversial bill, as long as they vote with the party line. This conventional
wisdom regarding the less party strategic nature of legislative speech, however, has not gone
unquestioned. Legislative speeches may also be prone to selection effects, as demonstrated
by Proksch and Slapin (2012) who found that in the parliaments of the United Kingdom and
Germany, the stronger the institutional incentives (electoral system, regime type, candidate
selection) for party leaders to protect the party label, the less likely legislative speeches are to
reflect true party cohesion since party leaders prevent potentially dissident backbenchers from
taking the floor. This suggests that speeches may also underestimate the ideological differences
within parties, especially if the electoral system is party-centered, but this effect has yet to be
explored in other contexts or in direct comparison with voting.
This paper directly compares the political positions estimated through roll call votes to
those estimated through legislative speeches, using the example of an energy policy debate
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from the Swiss legislature in 2002–2003. Switzerland’s parliament forms an ideal case for
comparing votes to speeches because all legislative speeches as well as complete sets of all
votes taken during each floor debate are recorded.1 Since multiple votes are taken during the
debate and passage of most bills, this provides multiple opportunities to observe votes during
the debate over a single piece of legislation. In the energy debate we have selected, for instance,
there were 66 different legislative votes, in addition to 30 separate speakers. To compare the
measurement of policy preferences using votes versus speeches, we use different combinations
of scaling procedures for roll call votes and speeches, e.g. one-dimensional IRT-based scaling
on the roll call votes (using a logit-based likelihood) and a similar one-dimensional IRT-based
scaling procedure on the speeches (using a Poisson-based likelihood). To investigate whether
the selection of speakers is systematically related to political variables, we also test a model of
speaker selection. Moreover, we test a model to predict text scaling positions using the nuclear
policy preferences in legislators’ electoral districts, extracted from two federal nuclear policy
referenda in Switzerland in 2003.
Our analysis confirms the widely held view that compared to the disciplined party voting
that takes place in most parliamentary systems, the positions expressed in legislative speeches
reveal larger heterogeneity in intra-party preferences. Spoken positions display a considerably
larger range of preferences than those expressed through voting, particularly within parties
with highly unified voting behavior. Furthermore, these divergences in observed behavior—
votes versus speeches—vary systematically according to constituency-level electoral prefer-
ences. Legislators tend to vote with their parties but speak to their constituents.
2 Data: Swiss Nuclear Legislation 2002–2003
Our comparison of policy measures constructed from votes and speeches comes from a key de-
bate that occurred in the Swiss legislature of the future of its nuclear policy. Following the 1986
nuclear disaster at Chernobyl, the Swiss voters had approved a 10-year moratorium on new nu-
clear plants, but in the same vote rejected a full-scale nuclear phaseout. After the expiration
1Thus the selection bias argument by Hug (2010) does not apply here since we use the same full dataset of all
recorded votes like Hug.
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of the moratorium, the debates in 2002–2003 revisited the nuclear phaseout question, focusing
as well on national energy policy with respect to alternative forms of renewable energy. This
followed a period during which many European countries debated a nuclear phaseout, with
Germany for instance deciding to phase out its nuclear reactors in 2000. In Switzerland, these
decisions were made through parliamentary decision followed by referendums.
2.1 The Swiss Legislative Context
Switzerland’s legislative institutions meet three important conditions for the analysis of the
differences between scaling results based on roll call votes and those based on texts. First,
during most legislative debates, many votes are taken and all votes are recorded as roll calls,
providing a large amount of voting data to estimate the positions of individual legislators. In
the energy debate that we examine, we draw on 66 different roll call votes taken during the
debate and passage of a major energy reform bill.
Second, the protracted debate also leaves a rich record of statements and speeches made by
individual legislators, with every major party clearly setting out its position on the bill in the
debates. Our analysis is based on 30 MPs from 6 parties, with an average speech length per
MP of 2,580 words.2
Finally, the Swiss legislature is characterized by relatively weak party control over who
speaks and what may be said. Swiss parliamentary rules and procedures provide for rela-
tively strong individual and minority rights for MPs (Damgaard, 1995; Do¨ring, 1995; Schwarz,
Ba¨chtiger and Lutz, 2011) as well as flat internal hierarchies. Formal and informal agenda-
setting powers of the parliamentary elite (party leaders, most senior MPs like committee chairs,
parliamentary presidents), which would lead to ‘incomplete’ records of floor debates because
of the control of legislative procedures by partisan actors (Proksch and Slapin, 2012), are in
many ways curbed in the Swiss case. The rules of procedure in the Swiss parliament empower
each MP to file petitions (amendments)3 to any lawmaking proposal, leaving few mechanisms
2The debate had 58 separate speakers in total. We excluded all non-German speeches and speeches which did
not meet further criteria listed in detail in the Appendix.
3Throughout this paper we use ‘petition’ as generic term for all kinds of parliamentary requests to alter the
status quo.
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for party leaders to stifle or punish MPs who speak freely in a debate.4 Furthermore, each pe-
tition ensures the submitting MP the right to present and defend it during the floor debate, and
there is a vote on every petition. Every lawmaking project is therefore accompanied by detailed
debates about disputed aspects with separate votes taken on each of these aspects, in addition
to the compulsory votes on the entire lawmaking project (such as the final passage).
2.2 Rules and Procedures During Debates
Government bills undergo extensive debate in committees before reaching the floor. Commit-
tee decisions, however, do not bar opposing party groups or MPs from later filing petitions
to re-write specific parts of the bill (see also Schwarz, Ba¨chtiger and Lutz, 2011). The usual
procedure is as follows. First, committee majority speakers (rapporteurs) present a general in-
troduction to the matter. Second, party group speakers5 communicate the official party position
to the proposed bill. Third, the government lays down its position. Next, a vote is taken as to
whether the chamber shall refuse the bill from the outset or enter a detailed debate (article-by-
article). If they decide to enter the debate, all disputed parts of the bill (where petitions have
been filed in the run-up to the floor debate) are separately discussed with opinions given by the
originator(s) of the petition, the committee rapporteur(s), party group speakers, and the gov-
ernment. Having discussed and voted on all petitions, the chamber then takes an overall vote
on the wording of the entire bill and refers it to the second chamber where the whole process
starts anew. After resolving any disagreements on the wording of the bill (through the navette
procedure), each chamber takes a final passage vote.
The rules of the Swiss National Council limit each MP’s speaking time. There are six
debate categories ranging from ‘free debate’ to ‘written procedure.’6 The energy policy debate
4Party leaders lack strong and immediately effective instruments to enforce discipline and avoid unwanted
debates, mainly due to executive-legislative relations working similar to a separation-of-powers system (Linder,
2010; Schwarz, Ba¨chtiger and Lutz, 2011), Swiss parties being bottom-up organizations rooted in local and can-
tonal levels (Ladner, 2007), and the candidate-centered (open-list) voting system with the 26 cantons as electoral
districts where the candidates also get nominated.
5This is not a permanent, institutionalized role (like that of the party group leader) but changes according to
the topic or bill under consideration. Usually, party groups have assigned a number or MPs (mostly members of
the related committee) as spokesperson for specific policy areas.
6See art. 47-50 of National Council’s rules of procedure, GRN (http://www.admin.ch/ch/d/sr/171_13/
index.html).
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Table 1: Allocation of speaking times in the selected energy debate.
Debate stage Speaker Category Time allotted
Entry debate Committee rapporteur 20 min total
Party group speakers 10 min each
Petition sponsor 5 mins
Any other MP 5 mins each
Government 20 mins
Other parts of the debate Committee rapporteur Unrestricted
Party group speakers 5 mins each
Petition sponsor 5 mins
Any other MP 5 mins each
Government Unrestricted
Before final passage vote Party group speakers Brief statement allowed
explored here was held under the category ‘free debate’.7 Table 1 specifies how speaking time
in free debates is assigned to MPs and parliamentary roles.
The rules of procedure also determine who is entitled to speak. Compared to conventional
parliamentary systems, the role of party leaders in controlling the selection of speakers is rela-
tively weak. The role of the party group speaker is usually assigned to MPs who are members
of the related committee (but committee members are not party speakers by default). Moreover,
as any MP is entitled to file any petition to re-write specific sections of a lawmaking proposal,
which then allows her to present and defend it on the floor, party leader control over who speaks
is limited to informal methods (e.g. internal appeals to preserve the party brand and apply self-
constraint, or exerting peer pressure See Cox and McCubbins (1993); Owens (2006)).8 We
explore the question of systematic selection of speakers below, but first we briefly describe the
main features of the energy policy debate and outline our data analysis procedure to measure
policy preferences of Swiss legislators from both the votes and speeches.
7The ‘free debate’ is the default category; speaking time is assigned according to art. 44 GRN.
8Similar to the U.S. context, there are strong incentives for Swiss MPs to favor constituency interests over
those of national party leaders (Hertig, 1980; Schwarz, 2009). The big difference, however, is the fragmented
multi-party system (ten parties are currently represented in Swiss parliament) which is why catch-all or simple
median voter strategies fail to be successful in National Council elections. Thus Swiss parties are ideologically
more cohesive than their U.S. counterparts.
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2.3 The Energy Policy Debate of 2002–2003
Our analysis in this paper focuses on a piece of legislation central to Switzerland’s energy
policy. The debate took place between 20 June 2002 and 21 March 2003 within the 46th
legislature convened from 1999–2003.9 The legislation concerned several much-debated and
long-standing issues of energy policy: whether to phase out nuclear power, as well as strate-
gies to increase the share of renewable energies.10 In the aftermath of the 1986 Chernobyl
disaster, the Swiss voters had approved a 10-year moratorium on new nuclear plants, but in the
same vote had rejected a full phaseout of nuclear power. The 2002–2003 debate we analyze
covers two popular initiatives almost identical to those of 1990: the first demanding a renewal
of the 1990 ban and the second again aiming at a nuclear phaseout. The Swiss government
disagreed with both but drafted a new Federal Act on Nuclear Energy, which was debated in
parliament together with the two initiatives. This law was designed as a counter-proposal to
the anti-nuclear initiatives, which would automatically take effect if the initiatives were to be
rejected. The government’s draft took some of the initiatives’ concerns into account while at
the same time neglecting their main points (ban and/or phaseout). It provided for tougher rules
for the construction permit of new plants and the recycling of nuclear materials, as well as an
energy tax to promote renewable energies. The sometimes quite heated debates pitted environ-
mental interests, led by the Greens (GPS) and the Social-democrats (SP), against the economic
concerns emphasized by a majority of Christian-democrats (CVP), the liberal Free Democrats
(FDP) and the national-conservative Swiss Peoples Party (SVP). During these debates, 66 votes
were taken in the National Council.11 In May 2003, two months after the final passage vote in
parliament, a popular vote on the two initiatives took place. The Swiss electorate’s rejection of
the initiatives paved the way for the rather nuclear-friendly federal act to come into force.
9The official title of the acts were ‘Moratorium plus’ and ‘Power without Nuclear’ and Federal Act on Nuclear
Energy (official bill no. 01.022; for details, see http://www.parlament.ch/d/suche/seiten/geschaefte.
aspx?gesch_id=20010022.
10A formidable summary (in German and French) of the debate can be found under http://www.parlament.
ch/d/suche/seiten/legislaturrueckblick.aspx?rb_id=20010022. The full verbatim transcripts of the en-
tire debate in the National Council starts under http://www.parlament.ch/ab/frameset/d/n/4614/62109/
d_n_4614_62109_62110.htm?DisplayTextOid=62111.
11The type of the votes varies from those in which the project in its entirety is at stake (i.e., vote on entry into
detailed deliberation at the beginning of the debate, overall vote on the bill after first reading, and final passage
vote after agreement between the two chambers is reached) to those on detailed aspects (MP petitions).
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In the speeches made during the various stages of the debate, all political parties were
represented. Our analysis is based on 275 speeches made by 30 legislators (median length
2,000 words, mean 2,580 words).
3 Measuring Legislator Positions from Roll Call Votes
We begin by scaling the one-dimensional positions of MPs in the energy debate using IRT-based
roll call vote analysis. We selected the 66 votes held during the energy legislation, as well as the
entire set of 3,194 votes from the 46th legislative period as a baseline. In the one-dimensional
representation of ideal points12 the line-up of all parties represents their expected order and is
quite similar to the full picture of the 46th legislative period, as depicted in Figure 1.13 In both
models, the Social Democrats (red) and the Greens form the left (i.e., environmentalist, anti-
nuclear) position, the Christian-democrats (orange) occupy the center while the FDP-Liberals
(blue) and the Swiss People’s Party (dark green) take center-right to right-end positions on the
scale. The position of the small Protestant People’s Party (turquoise) is located between the
two main camps.
The results of the two IRT models are highly correlated (Pearson’s r = .95). The model for
the single debate differs in two respects compared to the entire legislature, however: we find
considerably smaller intra-party variation among the left and a more blended picture among
the parties to the right. These differences reflect the fact that party unity is above average on
energy-related votes in the (already highly united) left camp while it is below average for CVP,
FDP-Liberals and SVP (Schwarz, 2009). While the attitude of all MPs in both left parties is
firmly anti-nuclear, there are well-known outliers in all political directions (nuclear hardliners
and MPs with moderately anti-nuclear positions) within the bourgeois parties.
12For ideal-point estimation we ran a one-dimensional item response theory model using MCMCpack in R, with
parameters burnin=50,000, mcmc=1,000,000, thin=1,000.
13Here we have estimated the divide in one dimension. Expert surveys, party manifesto research and roll call
analysis unequivocally characterize Swiss politics as predominantly uni-dimensional on a classical left-right axis
(Benoit and Laver, 2006; Hug and Schulz, 2007). We also fitted the two-dimensional IRT model to the energy
debate, but the ranking order did not substantially differ from the first dimension. It thus seems safe to conclude
that, from an RCV perspective, the selected energy debate is predominantly uni-dimensional and given the almost
perfect correlation between the two IRT models shown above, the dimension found in the energy debate can be
roughly labeled as left-right. This is important because the comparison of roll call estimates and text scaling
estimates in section 5 is carried out on a one-dimensional basis (due to dimensional limitations in text scaling
methods).
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Figure 1: Box plots of MP one-dimensional ideal points from roll call votes (energy bill and
entire 46th legislature, grouped by party).
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The distributions of MP ideal points in the energy bill votes according to Figure 1 suggest
that the relatively homogeneous left camp (Greens and Social-democrats) faces a far less united
bourgeois camp on the center-right. But how often do MPs actually vote in accordance or
against the majority of their party? The box plots in Figure 2 visualize the distribution of
MP agreement rates by party.14 As expected, we find the lowest agreement average and the
highest dispersion of MP agreement with a considerable number of outliers within the two
center-right parties (CVP, FDP-Liberals), but also the more extreme right SVP has a number
of outliers within their ranks. Moreover, the agreement rates particularly for the CVP and the
FDP-Liberals are somewhat lower in the selected energy case than in the entire 46th legislature,
while we find the opposite picture for the two parties on the left. This fits well to the ideal point
estimations in Figure 1.
All in all, the distribution of the RCV ideal point estimates and the agreement rates point
to the relatively low capabilities among center-right parties to enforce party discipline (weakly
restricted voting behavior) while party unity among the Social-democrats and the Greens is
very high.
4 Measuring Legislator Positions from Speeches
4.1 What Determines Who Speaks?
Roll call vote analysis to estimate ideal points is often criticized because the selection of ob-
servable votes is politically determined, thereby producing downward-biased estimates of intra-
party heterogeneity (Carrubba et al., 2006). Recent research has centered on a similar discus-
sion with regard to selection effects in parliamentary speeches, suggesting that bias in speaker
selection as well as the content of speeches varies with the institutional context (Proksch and
Slapin, 2012). Proksch and Slapin (2012)’s argument is based on a well-established view
that parliamentary rules and legislative behavior are endogenous to electoral competition (e.g.
Carey, 2007; Hix, 2004; Mayhew, 1974). Thus, in political systems that foster an individual
14The agreement rate is calculated as follows: If an MP agrees with the majority of his or her party, the assigned
value per vote is +1, if she disagrees it is 0, if she abstains the assigned value is 0.5. The box plots show the average
MP agreement per party.
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Figure 2: Box plots of MP agreement with own party (energy bill votes and entire 46th legisla-
ture).
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relationship between MPs and their voters, party leaders are more likely to accept speeches that
deviate from the party line. By contrast, in contexts where these relations are mediated by the
party, and party unity matters, the party leadership is likely to prohibit expression of dissent
on the parliamentary floor. Proksch and Slapin (2012) argue that due to these constraints, the
scaling of speeches in these political contexts encounters problems that are similar to those
found in the analysis of roll call votes.
The rules in the Swiss parliament are only minimally restrictive, reflecting the strong com-
ponent of ‘individual accountability’ (Carey, 2009) in the Swiss political system (Traber, Hug
and Sciarini, 2014). Compared to other parliamentary systems with a proportional representa-
tion electoral system, party leaders in the Swiss parliament have little formal means to control
their backbenchers. If an MP is unhappy with her party’s majority position and would like to
make her disagreement public, she can file a personal petition to change the unwanted part of
the proposed bill, and she will be granted five minutes to defend her view on the floor. We
thus argue that contrary to other parliaments, not only is the selection of speakers in the Swiss
parliament less biased, but also that the speakers are less constrained in their statements if they
diverge from the party line.
We estimated two types of models to detect possible selection bias in legislative speeches.
The results are shown in Table 2. The first model is a logistic regression model that tests
whether certain MPs have higher probability to speak based on a number of individual char-
acteristics, such as language, role within the party and policy position (ideal points). Besides
the general policy position, measured on the basis of all votes in one legislative period15, we
included the distance between the MPs’ ideal points in the energy debate and the party’s policy
median in this debate. The model also takes account of constituency preferences on the en-
ergy debate, represented by the average share of Yes votes in the popular vote on the nuclear
moratorium referendum from May 2003. We model a quadratic relationship, because MPs
from cantons where the share of yes votes was especially high or especially low might be more
likely to speak than MPs from cantons where the population was more polarized.16
15Ideological position is measured by ideal point estimates calculated on the basis of the entire 46th legislative
period (see section 3).
16 We thank an anonymous reviewer for referring to this point.
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Table 2: Models to predict speech act and speech length
Dependent Variable
Speech act (Logit) log(Speech length) (OLS)
Variable (1) (2)
Party leader 3.056 0.580
[ 0.254, 42.181] [-0.620, 1.780]
Language = french or italian 0.184 -0.111
[ 0.041, 0.694] [-0.900, 0.680]
Sex: female 0.360 0.053
[ 0.097, 1.183] [-0.550, 0.650]
Seniority (log weeks) 0.672 0.085
[ 0.310, 1.412] [-0.300, 0.470]
Committee member 148.727 1.422
[ 32.406, 1021.463] [ 0.860, 1.980]
Abs. distance to 0.433 0.533
party median (energy debate) [ 0.032, 3.941] [-0.560, 1.620]
RCV Idealpoints 0.457 -0.121
[ 0.308, 0.636] [-0.290, 0.050]
Share of yes votes in popular 0.434 -0.047
referendums (average) [ 0.202, 0.877] [-0.340, 0.240]
Share of yes votes in popular 1.011 0.001
referendums 2 [ 1.002, 1.021] [ 0.000, 0.000]
Constant – 6.367
– [ 0.250,12.490]
Log-likelihood -56.830
Adjusted R2 0.386
N 199 48
Note: The models were estimated using the Zelig package (Imai, King, and Lau 2007).
Model 1 includes all MPs and predict who speaks, using odds-ratios and corresponding
95%-confidence intervals, with any rejecting the null hypothesis with p ≤ 0.05 high-
lighted in bold type. Model 2 predicts MP’s speech length as the log of number of
words spoken during one debate and include only MPs who spoke during the respective
debate, showing OLS coefficients and corresponding 95%-confidence intervals, with
any p≤ 0.05 in bold.
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The second, linear, model includes the same variables to test whether the length of an MP’s
speech is determined by these characteristics. The most important result in Table 2 is that
committee members appear to speak more often and much longer than their fellow MPs. Apart
from committee membership, however, none of the other MP attributes consistently determines
legislative speech. Apparently, leftist MPs are more likely to speak than MPs on the right side
of the policy spectrum in this debate, but we find no evidence that party leaders and party group
leaders speak systematically more often than backbenchers.17 What is more, there seems to be
no restrictions for MPs with positions that are distant from the party’s policy median.
In sum, Swiss MPs participate in debates according to their interests and without signifi-
cant institutional constraints, and not in a way relating to a specific role within the party. We
therefore do not expect our measures to be affected by selection bias from the censorship of
speakers by party leaders based on the positions they might have expressed, as measured by
whether or how long they speak.
4.2 Text Scaling Estimates
To scale MP positions using their speeches, we fit the Poisson scaling model of Slapin and
Proksch (2008), which estimates the position θi of each text i on a single latent dimension.
This model has been applied to parliamentary speeches to estimate MP positions in other par-
liaments, such as pro- and anti-EU positioning in the European Parliament (Proksch and Slapin,
2010) and to preferences for austerity in Irish budget speeches (Benoit and Lowe, 2013). The
advantage of the Poisson scaling method is that as an unsupervised method, it requires no
“training” step or identification of known positions. Furthermore, its method closely matches
that of the one-dimensional IRT model, and can be viewed itself as a one-dimensional IRT
model for count data (Lowe, 2008).18
The Poisson scaling results for the energy debate are shown in Figure 3. The plot shows
party groupings that are quite similar to those in the previous roll call analysis in section 3,
17In fact, party group leaders are excluded from the models because they did not participate at all in the debate.
Also not included in the models as separate independent variable is whether an MP has filed a petition since all
petitioners are granted access to the floor and thus speak.
18Our estimation method differs from the RCV scaling only in that we use a maximimum likelihood method,
from the R package austin. The text estimates are based on texts aggregated by MP, with pre-processing and text
selection performed as we have described in the Appendix.
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Figure 3: Text scaling results (Wordfish) for energy debates, grouped by party.
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There are also significant intra-party differences, but in contrast to previous roll call analysis
they do not only occur within the center and center-right parties, but also within the parties on
the left. This hints at intra-party differences in preferences which are not revealed in roll call
votes.
5 Comparing Vote Scaling to Text Scaling
Our expectation is that the political censorship affecting roll call votes – a well known result
attributed to both party discipline in parliamentary voting and RCV selection bias (Carrubba
15
et al., 2006)– will make the scaled positions from roll call votes significantly less heterogenous
than corresponding estimates from text scaling. What ultimately matters is how legislators vote,
rather than what they say, and party leaders may consider it within each legislator’s perogative
to speak against a party’s official position, as long as they support it with their votes.
Figure 4: RCV Scaling (IRT) versus Text Scaling (Wordfish). Pearson’s r = .94.
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To compare positions from the two measures, we plot the text scaling results against the roll
call vote positional estimates. Figure 4 compares IRT-based RCV scalings with the text scaling
results from the Poisson IRT-type model.19 The results show an interesting contrast that is not
entirely in accord with our expectations, probably due to a relative lack of party discipline in
voting in the Swiss system. We see different patterns for the center-right and rightist parties
19As a robustness check, we also compared text scaling results from Laver, Benoit and Garry (2003)’s “Word-
scores” procedure, as well as to the first dimension from a correspondence analysis. Both produced largely equiv-
alent results to those shown.
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(CVP, FDP-Liberals and SVP) on the one hand and the left parties (SP and GPS) on the other
hand. While the compared estimates for the bourgeois parties are located around an imaginary
diagonal line, the comparison shows for the left camp positional homogeneity along the x-axis
(as is to be expected according to the results in section 3) but heterogeneity along the y-axis.
This suggests that where party discipline is relatively low and thus MPs relatively unconstrained
in their voting behavior roll call analysis and text analysis produce quite similar results. Where
party unity is strong and voting behavior constrained, as within the SP and GPS 20 , text analysis
picks up differences which are not detected through votes.
However, the intra-party differences revealed through text analysis do not constitute a major
shake-up of left positions. Most notably, and very important for the substantive plausibility
of the results, despite higher variation within the left parties, the text scaling results clearly
separate the anti-nuclear and pro-nuclear MPs. Thus the text analysis results do not claim that
the intra-party difference found within left parties would reveal hidden sympathies for nuclear
energy which would have been highly implausible given the credible engagement of virtually
all MPs to the left in favor of the two initiatives during the later referendum campaign. The
text scalings point to more subtle differences among left MPs, probably rooted in the type of
arguments brought forward and the way the arguments are presented: left MPs in opposition
to nuclear energy, but who pick up the technical and economic vocabulary of the advocates of
nuclear energy may receive text scaling positions slightly closer to the pro-nuclear camp.
Thus far, our results match our expectations well, clearly showing less party discipline in
speech-making than observed through voting. A further test of how speech differs from the
party line will be to see if we can explain the gap between spoken positions and positions from
voting as the result of political variables specific to each speaker, rather than methodological
artifacts stemming from different data structures and estimation methods.
5.1 Explaining Text Scaling Positions
The energy debate linked together a new federal act and two anti-nuclear popular initiatives.
The results of these referendums provide valuable information about voter preferences, both in
20In the Swiss case, voting constraints are not a result of strong whipping but of peer pressure and ideological
cohesion (see section 2.1).
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general and on the level of MPs’ electoral districts (cantons).
Both popular initiatives against nuclear energy – the initiative for nuclear phaseout and the
initiative for a 10-year ban on new nuclear plants – were rejected by the Swiss voters on May 18,
2003. However, from a regional perspective the rejection was not unequivocal: the city canton
of Basel-Stadt embraced both initiatives by a substantial margin, and in surrounding Basel-
Landschaft the moratorium initiative also received a majority. Moreover, there was substantial
variation in the results between cantons. Figure 5 plots the variation by canton in support for
both referendum measures. In the case of the phaseout initiative, for example, the share of
support varied from 23% in the distinctive pro-nuclear canton of Aargau21 and 52% in the most
skeptical canton of Basel-Stadt.
The regional variation followed two main patterns.is not accidental. First, previous referen-
dum results have shown that people living in rural areas as well as those in the French-speaking
(western) part of Switzerland are less likely to share “green” positions. However, the maps
in Figure 5 do not reveal a clear-cut picture which would satisfyingly explain the referendum
results of 2003 (regarding contrasts between urban and rural areas the depicted regional enti-
ties are also too wide-meshed to draw valid conclusions). Furthermore, since our analysis only
includes speeches in German language, we are not in a position to test the effect of language-
related cultural variables.
A second pattern combines personal concerns and financial federalism. People living in
the wider area around the five nuclear plants share more or less the same risks, but for those
living in the cantons where the nuclear plants are located the risks are somewhat outweighed by
corporate tax revenues of the power plant operators and the income tax revenues of the highly
qualified staff working in these sites.22 Furthermore, the personal concern aspect extends to
two French nuclear sites close to the Swiss border. The Fessenheim plant is most proximate to
the cantons of Basel-Stadt, Basel-Landschaft and Jura (but also to nuclear-friendly canton of
21The canton of Aargau hosts 3 of Switzerland’s 5 nuclear reactors, the country’s interim storage facility for
spent fuel elements, and the Paul Scherrer Institute (the energy research department of the Swiss Federal Institute
of Technology ETH).
22One could even push this argument to the municipal level because Swiss tax competition also plays between
municipalities within each canton which means that the best tax deal by far – apart from the direct view on a
cooling tower in some sites – gets the municipality where the nuclear plant is located. In this paper we do not
follow further this path but stay at cantonal level.
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Figure 5: Regional variation in support for (a) nuclear phaseout and (b) the moratorium ini-
tiatives of May 18, 2003, and the locations of Switzerland’s 5 active nuclear reactors.
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Aargau), and until the mid-1990s there were seven French nuclear reactors near Geneva.23
Thus our theoretical expectation is that the signals MPs send in their speeches to their con-
stituents follow the variation in regional concern (both in terms of health risks and unequal share
of economic benefits): MPs from nuclear-friendly cantons and those from nuclear-skeptical
cantons adapt their speeches accordingly (even if sometimes in a very subtle way).
Moreover, the post-referendum survey among voters (the so-called VOX analysis, see Blaser
et al., 2003) with regard to the two energy-related popular initiatives found significant effects of
a voter’s age (younger voters) and sex (females) on approval of the two initiatives (apart from
obvious variables like political affiliations, e.g. left-wing voters who sympathized with GPS or
SP were heavily in favor of the initiatives).
Consequently we tested the explanatory power of the constituency preference measure
(share of approval in the anti-nuclear referenda) for the text analysis results with a couple
of linear regression models. Additional independent variables were: roll call vote estimates for
the energy debate, party fixed effects (reference category is centrist CVP), MPs’ age and sex.
Table 3 contains two reduced models (without constituency measures) and two full models
including the district-level measures (approval rates in phaseout and moratorium referenda).
The results confirm the theoretical expectations: in every model the effect of district prefer-
ence on the text scalings is significant at .05 level or better.24 The higher the support for the
initiatives, the more to the left is the MP position in the text scaling. This is strong evidence
that individual MPs were speaking to their constituencies, yet voting with their party. Even
when controlling for party effects, legislators from constituencies more (or less) supportive of
the phaseout and the moratorium adapted their speeches accordingly, regardless of their party’s
majority position that guided the legislator’s vote. 25
23Two of them, most notably the notoriously insecure Superphe´nix fast breeder reactor in Creys-Malville, were
shut in 1994 and 1997 which partly explains why Geneva and other French-speaking cantons that were in favor of
a nuclear phaseout in a 1990 referendum changed their majority position in 2003.
24This holds also true when we use Wordscores or Correspondence Analysis for text scalings (not reported
here).
25The effects of the district level independent variables become non-significant when we run the same models
with roll call ideal points as dependent variable (results not shown here). This corroborates our interpratation of
the results. We thank an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion.
20
Table 3: OLS Regression Models to Predict Text Scalings (Wordfish)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
RCV idealpoints 0.616 0.428 0.371 0.390
[0.537,0.696] [0.130,0.726] [0.105,0.638] [0.127,0.654]
Approval rate in -0.016
phaseout referendum [-0.031,-0.002]
Approval rate in -0.019
moratorium referendum [-0.035,-0.003]
Age −0.007 −0.007
[-0.021,0.007] [-0.021,0.007]
Sex:female 0.230 0.240
[-0.056,0.515] [-0.043,0.524]
Party EVP −0.622 −0.512 −0.415
[-1.434,0.190] [-1.232,0.207] [-1.137,0.308]
Party FDP-Liberals −0.086 0.104 0.123
[-0.718,0.546] [-0.466,0.675] [-0.445,0.690]
Party GPS −0.746 -1.042 -0.960
[-1.500,0.008] [-1.764,-0.320] [-1.677,-0.242]
Party SP -0.754 -0.858 -0.773
[-1.437,-0.072] [-1.484,-0.231] [-1.405,-0.141]
Party SVP −0.148 −0.030 −0.020
[-0.801,0.505] [-0.624,0.564] [-0.610,0.569]
Constant 0.280 0.653 1.489 1.661
[0.151,0.409] [0.317,0.989] [0.572,2.406] [0.694,2.628]
Observations 30 30 30 30
Adjusted R2 0.888 0.893 0.917 0.919
Note: The models were estimated using the lm function in R. The models predict MP text scaling
positions (Wordfish), showing OLS coefficients and corresponding 95%-confidence
intervals, with any p≤ 0.05 in bold.
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6 Discussion
The direct comparison of roll call votes and speeches requires an institutional setting where
MPs can express their preferences on a specific topic relatively unconstrained both in multiple
votes and in speeches. Switzerland’s legislature comes quite close to this ideal: The debate
explored in our analysis involved 66 roll call votes, and we could show that there was relatively
unbiased MP access to the microphone.
Our analysis of legislative speeches made during the crucial Swiss energy debate in 2002–
2003 has shown that significant differences exist between estimates from roll call votes and
estimates from texts. The estimates from roll call votes display some heterogeneity within
party, but their most distinctive feature is a relative similarity between legislators of the same
party, particularly among the highly united left. Far more heterogeneity, by contrast, appears
in positions taken in legislative speeches during the debates. The results strongly support the
hypothesis that MPs are less constrained in speeches than in votes.
Not only are preferences measured from legislative speech more heterogeneous than prefer-
ences measured from votes, but also this variation is neither random nor based on methodologi-
cal artifacts (binary roll calls on the one hand and large word frequency tables on the other). Our
analysis found that the vote shares at the district level in an energy policy referendum closely
linked with the investigated energy debate are significantly related to how legislators spoke
about the proposed bill during the parliamentary debates. The higher the anti-nuclear vote in
the electoral constituency, the more anti-nuclear are the positions as measured by text scalings.
This result reinforces our explanation of the observed differences found between roll call and
text analysis, demonstrating that these differences may be explained by different levels of in-
centives on individual legislators who must balance party versus constituency concerns. MPs
tended to adapt their speeches to constituencies, even when voting with their party’s official
position on the bill.
We have established that speech is more varied and less amenable to disciplinary actions
by party leaders than votes, which tend largely on party lines even in less strongly whipped
systems such as Switzerland. We have also shown that speeches made in parliament tend to
be aimed at constituents based on political preferences specific to an MP’s electoral district.
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The question remains whether these findings are generalizable to other countries. In this regard
two restrictions apply. First, our results are based on an in-depth study of a single debate.
The selected energy policy debate still constitutes an important and very contentious piece
of legislation in Switzerland. Results are expected to be different if less prominent or non-
controversial examples are investigated. Second, whether the results are generalizable to other
countries depends on the specific institutional setting, particularly regarding the degree of party
discipline in votes and party control over speeches. We expect similar results in countries with
weak party control over speeches and (relatively) high party discipline in roll calls.
Future research should focus on the difference between legislative voting and expressed
positions through speech in systems with greater party discipline, or where speakers themselves
may be censored as an extension of party discipline. Our analysis here however is a promising
indication that the political speeches of MPs target a different audience than their votes, and
that richer information about intra-party policy preferences can be found in the words that
legislators use than in the votes they cast.
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Appendix: Data Details
Regarding the institutional roles of some speakers we first excluded all speeches from par-
liamentary presidents because their speeches are always purely procedural. For instance, the
president of a parliamentary chamber plays a nonpartisan role in Switzerland, and does not
speak in debates or vote, except to break ties. This restriction included cutting 11 speeches
from the parliamentary vice-president. We also eliminated all 42 speeches of the members of
government. Government members (Federal Councilors) are not MPs; they neither vote nor
do their speeches purely represent the interest of their respective parties since the government
is organized as a collegial body. Finally, we also excluded 66 speeches from committee rap-
porteurs, because these speakers are charged with expressing the committee majority position,
which is not necessarily their own, but rather aimed at presenting a balanced assessment of the
committee debates and the reasoning that stands behind some of the most important decisions.
Apart from the exclusion of parliamentary presidents, committee rapporteurs and govern-
ment members, we further eliminated 20 purely procedural speeches, such as when an MP asks
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for the adjournment of the debate, or when a speaker issues short instructions, as well as 36
spontaneous interactions among MPs.26
The Swiss parliament is a multilingual body. Most MPs speak German or French, some
Italian (and in specific situations like inaugural addresses of newly elected government mem-
bers or in debates on cultural subjects some speeches may in parts be even in Rhaeto-Romanic
language). Unlike the European Parliament (Proksch and Slapin, 2010) there is no official
translation of the speeches. Thus there remain two research options: To translate the speeches
(preferably automatically using systems like Google Translate, see Benoit, Schwarz and Traber,
2012) or to start with language-specific scalings. We employed the second option, restricting
our analysis to the texts in German language. In doing so, we excluded 5 French-speaking MPs
from our analysis.
Finally, we removed all MPs from the analysis whose concatenated texts were shorter than
500 words (which is about one letter-size page of German text). The 500-word threshold is
purely empirically defined, based on the fact that text scalings with all three methods we em-
ployed (Wordscores, Wordfish, and correspondence analysis) tended to produce implausible
results for less talkative MPs.
26Procedural example: “Ich mo¨chte Ihnen nur schnell sagen, dass wir uns darauf geeinigt haben, dass im Rah-
men des Artikels 104 die Variante Sta¨nderat des Wiederaufarbeitungsmoratoriums nochmals zur Abstimmung
kommt.” Interaction example: “Herr Speck, Sie haben uns jetzt hier sehr rosige, zuversichtliche Zahlen vorgele-
sen. Ich frage mich, warum Sie dann so Angst haben und sich dermassen gegen diese Solidarhaftung wehren.”
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